A Human Security Strategy for the European Union in the Horn of Africa

Alex de Waal and Rachel Ibreck

Paper commissioned by the Human Security Study Group
Alex de Waal is executive director of the World Peace Foundation and Research Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has worked extensively on issues of humanitarianism, conflict and peace, especially in the Horn of Africa, and is author of *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, war and the business of power* (Polity 2015).

Rachel Ibreck is an LSE Fellow in International Development and holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations. Her research focuses on human rights activism and conflict in Africa, and currently includes work on land disputes in South Sudan for the *Justice and Security Research Programme* at LSE.

**Contact**
Alex de Waal: Alex.DeWaal@tufts.edu
Rachel Ibreck: R.Ibreck@lse.ac.uk

*Security in Transition*
February 2016, London
Abstract

This paper confronts the challenges of developing a European Union human security strategy for the Horn of Africa (HoA). It observes that the EU already has a broad strategy of regional engagement, driven by strategic interests, but there is a need for greater coherence and prioritization to respond to the specific forms and logics of governance that shape security in this region and to emerging security threats. It provides an overview of the history, geography and politics of the HoA and examines EU policy, and differences between its perspectives and those of the governments of the HoA, and civil society. It then analyses priority issues through a human security framework, including promoting human rights, addressing humanitarian crises and advancing economic development, and designing and implementing peace missions. It suggests that the EU engages more deeply with the region as a whole, while placing greater emphasis on the local empowerment necessary to realise human security. The EU must seek to understand and engage with public authority in its multiple forms and use its comparative advantage as a regional body to promote overlapping multilateral forums and mechanisms in the HoA and with neighbouring regions in Africa and the Middle East. Key actions should include preventing the emergent security crisis in the Red Sea, and encouraging bottom-up approaches and regional civil society.
Table of contents

1. Summary

2. Defining the Challenge
   a. Defining human security
   b. From the EU perspective
   c. From the perspective of the Governments of the Horn
   d. From a civil society perspective

3. Geographical and Historical Background
   a. A region of unparalleled diversity
   b. A poor region, with fast but uneven growth
   c. A region defined by geo-strategic concerns
   d. A turbulent political marketplace
   e. Contested multilateralism and the lack of a security community

   a. Promoting human rights
   b. Addressing humanitarian needs, advancing economic development and poverty reduction
   c. Seeking peace and security
   d. Promoting legitimate political authority and good governance
   e. Adherence to multilateral principles with a regional focus
   f. Peace missions
   g. Owning the agenda

5. Conclusion: Challenges for the EU and the Horn of Africa
   a. Strategic objective: A shared multilateralism, within the Horn and among regional organizations
   b. A human security engagement on people’s issues
Summary

This paper confronts the challenges of developing a European Union human security strategy for the Horn of Africa (HoA). Its aim is to identify overall strategic priorities and approaches for the region. The first part defines the concept of human security and examines the existing policy perspectives of the EU, the governments of the HoA, and civil society, highlighting tensions between them. It observes that the EU has pursued a broad engagement, but must aim for greater coherence and prioritization in future. It argues that the EU should adjust its vision to look beyond states and individuals and the relationships between them, and towards the reality of governance in the region which requires attention to public authority in its multiple forms. It advocates that the EU should seek to promote human security not only through partnerships with governments and the African Union but also through wider engagement with this broad array of governance mechanisms.

The ‘Horn of Africa’ is a region of great diversity and deep poverty. The second section explores these issues and situates them in geographical and historical context, explaining that this region is not self-defined: rather, world powers have identified the Horn in line with their interests, which are in turn framed by its geo-strategic location and the troubles it creates for their national interests. All these factors combine to generate continuing political turbulence and the absence of a stable regional security community. Indeed, the multilateral mechanisms in the region are themselves contested. This demands not only a multi-lateral approach, but also an approach of multiple and overlapping multi-lateralisms, including the promotion of regionalized civil society networks.

The third part of the paper provides an analysis of the challenges for human security based on the following framework:

(a) Promoting human rights (including civil and political rights and social, economic and cultural rights);

(b) Addressing humanitarian crises and advancing economic development (in the broad sense of enhancing all aspects of well-being);

(c) Seeking peace and security (including protection of people from all forms of organized violence);

(d) Promoting legitimate political authority and good governance (at all levels, not only the state);

---

This paper is largely based on research and engagement with key policymakers and civil society actors in the region as well as academic and documentary sources. In particular it draws on research for the Justice and Security Research Programme at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the first author’s role as a senior advisor to the African Union since 2005.
(e) Adherence to deepened and broadened multilateral principles with a regional focus and civil society engagement; and

(f) Designing and implementing peace missions with a human rights focus.

Underpinning all of these priorities is a fundamental question of agency. An historic misfortune of the HoA is that the region, its identity, and its priorities and programmes for peace, security and development, have been profoundly influenced by outsiders. As a matter of principle and efficacy, a human security strategy for the HoA must invest in regional ownership. This includes taking seriously existing national goals and priorities, and involving the region’s civil society, in debates on the future of the HoA.

The paper concludes with both specific and general recommendations for the next steps in developing EU policies for the HoA, including both top-down strategic engagement and encouraging bottom-up empowerment approaches.

I. Defining the Challenge

Defining human security

There are two overlapping general frameworks for human security (MacFarlane and Khong 2006). The first focuses primarily on protection from organized violence, and the second on protecting and promoting a broad range of human capabilities. The European Union conceptualization of human security has combined elements of both traditions, with a particular focus on how to operationalize a human security approach in the context of armed interventions (Barcelona Group 2004). Our understanding of human security adopts this definition while placing particular emphasis on the role of local agency. We employ human security as both an analytical lens, through which we can assess current policy approaches and challenges, and as a normative goal for EU policy in future.

The first key element of a human security doctrine is based on the shift from paradigms of security focusing overwhelmingly on sovereign states, to those focused on individuals. This approach has been associated with the doctrine of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ (Rothchild and Deng 1996) and the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001) which coined and promoted the norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). Analytical work has focused on the human cost of war and the plight of individuals caught up in political violence and armed conflict (Human Security Report 2005; 2013), while policy work has revolved around: (a) the international diplomatic, financial and military instruments for deterring and punishing violence against civilians, and mandating armed interventions; and (b) the responsibilities of peacekeeping missions to protect civilians in their areas of operation.

The second approach is associated with the broadening of economic development to take account of a broad spectrum of human wellbeing issues, including especially
resilience in the face of shocks and stresses (UNDP 1994; Alkire 2005). This approach also focuses upon human empowerment. In the Report of the Human Security Commission (2003), Sadaka Ogata and Amartya Sen articulate a distinctive view of human security, in which ‘[a]chieving human security includes not just protecting people but also empowering people to fend for themselves.’ (p. 4). In a notable divergence from the immediately prior report of the ICISS, the Human Security Commission emphasized how human security complements state security, and how empowerment is a complement to protection:

People’s ability to act on their own behalf—and on behalf of others—is the second key to human security. Fostering that ability differentiates human security from state security, from humanitarian work and even from much development work. Empowerment is important because people develop their potential as individuals and as communities. Strengthening peoples’ abilities to act on their own behalf is also instrumental to human security.

Following Mary Kaldor (2007), we adopt a human security framework that includes the following elements: (a) promoting human rights; (b) advancing economic development in the broad sense of enhancing all aspects of well-being; (c) seeking peace and security; (d) promoting legitimate political authority and good governance (within which we emphasize empowerment); and (e) adherence to multilateral principles with a regional focus. Additionally, we examine the extent to which UN and AU peace missions in the Horn are conducted in line with human security concerns.

From the EU Perspective

The EU’s strategic framework for its engagement with the HoA, adopted in 2011, foregrounds a concern for human security, while recognizing the serious political instability in this region. It begins:

The political evolution of the Horn of Africa over the past 50 years has been unusually turbulent. The objective of the European Union is therefore to support the people of the region in achieving greater peace, stability, security, prosperity and accountable government.

We concur that persistent turbulence is a defining feature of the politics of the region. We define turbulence as the structural (and therefore long-term) characteristic of a political system that is unpredictable or chaotic over the short term, because it is poorly institutionalized and vulnerable to shocks. We assume that this will remain the case for most of the countries of the HoA, for the foreseeable future.

The EU’s strategy document continues:

The EU’s interests in the Horn of Africa are defined by the region’s geo-strategic importance, the EU’s historic engagement with the countries of the region, its desire to support the welfare of the people and help lift them from poverty into self-sustaining economic growth, and the need for the EU to protect its own
citizens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the region and address common challenges.

This strategy is underpinned not only by broad concerns about the welfare of people in this region, but also by elements of the geo-strategic interest that are worth spelling out in more detail because they influence the implementation of the HoA strategy in the present and for the future:

1. The HoA is at the southern end of the Red Sea, across from the Arab peninsular. It is critical for the security of maritime trade through the Suez Canal (about half of Europe’s seaborne trade).

2. France, Italy, and the U.K. have colonial histories in the Horn, and many countries including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Norway, Sweden, have longstanding commercial, diplomatic and other ties.

3. The EU is committed to the MDGs/SDGs, and progress in the HoA is important to those (and especially to poverty reduction).

4. Several significant threats to Europe emanate from the Horn, including:
   a. Mass migration;
   b. Violent extremism/terrorism;
   c. Maritime piracy;
   d. Conflict involving Red Sea and Gulf states (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar), which embroil the countries of the Horn.

These challenges need to be explicitly defined within a human security framework.

The Strategic Framework led to three priority actions: an Action Plan on Counter-terrorism for the Horn of Africa and Yemen; an Action Plan on Counter-Piracy; and the Support to the Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE) initiative. Subsequently, in response to the mass exodus, especially from Eritrea, the EU became a partner in the Khartoum Process, intended better to prevent and manage the mass distress migration from the region to Europe. Additionally, as the major donor to the African Peace Facility (the funding mechanism for AU peace operations, notably the AU Mission in Somalia), as well as through the assessed contributions of EU member states to UN peacekeeping, the EU is deeply engaged in peace operations in the HoA. It therefore has a direct interest in the design and implementation of AU and UN peace operations.

The priority actions associated with the Strategic Framework address issues that impact on the human security of people in the region, however they indicate a relatively narrow definition of security and a predominant focus on threats from the HoA to the EU.
The revised strategy for 2015-2020, adopted in October 2015, built upon previous policies and also highlighted new challenges for the region. One of these was the spillover from the conflict in Yemen and the associated need ‘to integrate the Arabian Peninsula as well as Egypt and Libya, to work across borders so as to focus on peripheral regions and transnational challenges’ (p. 6). Another new priority was integrating Tanzania into aspects of the regional policy for the Horn, recognizing that this country also faces many of the same challenges. The widening regional lens is a welcome shift, recognizing the need to situate the HoA in its wider regional context.

A general theme of analyzing EU policy towards the Horn is the multiplicity of overlapping mechanisms and instruments. It is hard to find an issue in the Horn of Africa in which the EU is not engaged, in some manner. The policy challenge is not breadth of engagement or the comprehensive nature of the policies, but rather the questions of coherence, prioritization and comparative advantage. The framework is not fixed and there is some overlap and redundancy in policy engagement. This has its advantages. Given the turbulent and unpredictable nature of the Horn, this breadth of engagement also provides flexibility and opportunities for responding to new challenges, in part by taking up the slack of under-utilized tools. However, this should not be an excuse for failure to prioritize, a point succinctly expressed by Pierre Vimont (2015, p. 7):

\[\text{[A]n enhanced EU foreign policy requires a more lucid approach to priorities. All too often, Europe has lacked the realistic touch when it comes to setting the scope of its external interventions: too much appetite for action compared with its capabilities and overambitious objectives that are not matched by sufficient means. Europe today is in urgent need of a more calibrated and focused diplomacy.}\]

Reflecting this, rather than a catalogue of specific actions for each of the multitude of EU foreign policy instruments, we argue for further elaboration of the overall strategic priorities for the EU’s engagement (we present these through a human security framework in the discussion below). Yet the EU must also reckon with the perspectives of other key actors in the region and find ways to creatively engage with their differing priorities.

\textit{From the Perspective of the Governments of the Horn}

The overriding concern of the governments of Horn is the short-term challenge of political survival. Several of the region’s leaders are experts at management of the ‘political marketplace’ (de Waal 2015). Their political strategies are aimed at staying afloat amid the turbulence and unpredictability of the region, occasionally turning these features to their advantage. Most of the countries of the region have political economies reliant on external rents, including oil (South Sudan and Sudan), and security cooperation with the U.S. and with Gulf countries (Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan). International aid is also a source of rents, though it is less significant, compared to other flows of finance, than in the 1980s and ‘90s.
It follows that international policies towards the HoA need to be well-attuned to the fact that political leaders in the region will manipulate and exploit any external initiatives to their advantage. The tactics used include the time-honoured stratagems of the ‘Janus face’ and ‘isomorphic mimicry’—presenting a façade to the international community while governing internally on different principles—alongside creative variants of tactical security rent-seeking.

Ethiopia is alone in the region in having a well-developed long-term political and economic programme, of the ‘democratic developmental state.’ This entails, inter alia, an ‘economy-first’ national security strategy (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2002), which envisages accelerated economic growth as the foundation of national survival.

From a Civil Society Perspective

Pan-Africanism has historically been a people’s project, driven by activists, students, scholars and other members of civil society first and foremost (Sutherland and Meyer 2000). The global Pan African movement was at its height during the anti-colonial struggle, and African civil society networks played a leading role in formulating the agenda for creating the African Union at the turn of the millennium. Key norms adopted by the AU including the ban on unconstitutional changes in government and the principle of non-indifference to grievous crimes (African Union Constitutive Act, Articles 4(p) and 4(h), came about in significant part through civil society pressure. Over the subsequent years, African governments have reasserted their primacy over all aspects of the AU, and the role of civil society has diminished markedly. Although the AU and IGAD mechanisms for engaging civil society are weakly utilized, and the governments of the HoA are almost uniformly hostile to civil society in their respective countries (Bereketeab 2009; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2015), nonetheless there is sufficient civil society mobilization in the region for citizens’ priorities to be known (Life and Peace Institute 2014). Regional civil society has organized around the following issues:

- Human rights and accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. South Sudanese lawyers, religious leaders, journalists and organized civil society organizations have notably converged around demands for justice in the context of the atrocities committed in South Sudan.

- Peace and security. Every peace process in the region is accompanied by pressure from civil society actors for expedited progress towards an end to organized violence, and also for civil society representation in the peace talks. However, compared to the situation in the early 2000s, when civil society was setting the agenda, what is happening today is that civil society actors are scrambling to be part of an agenda set by governments and inter-governmental organizations. Governments in the region have closed down most of the space for civil society, and
the regional organizations have not compensated by opening up regional spaces for dialogue.

- Freedom of expression. Eritrea and Ethiopia regularly rank at the foot of lists of the countries with most restrictive legislation on the media: in 2015 Eritrea was the worst and Ethiopia the fourth-worst (Committee to Protect Journalists 2015). Somalia and South Sudan are among the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist (Committee to Protect Journalists 2016). Yet journalists and writers continue to try by every means to have their voices heard.

- Constitutionalism and free and fair elections. Striking examples include the brief ‘Asmara Spring’ of 2001 in which civil society leaders in Eritrea demanded a democratic and constitutional government, and the Girifna movement for non-violent civic mobilization in Sudan (Anonymous 2012).

- Gender. Demands for gender equality are ubiquitous. Despite enormous strides in improving women’s life chances, especially in education, the HoA lags badly in all components of equitable gender representation in the political sphere. Civil society groups campaign against sexual and gender-based violence that is prevalent in the region (Life and Peace Institute 2014).

- Respect for diversity and inclusive politics. In a region characterized by long histories of marginalization and exclusion based on ethnicity, race or religion, civil society organizations have been the most prominent in demanding more inclusive politics. The historic refusal of governments to accommodate civil society demands for cultural rights prompted some socio-cultural movements to morph into armed resistance.

- Land rights. At a local level, land rights are a high priority for community groups in every country. Opposition to large-scale land acquisitions has generated community mobilization, manifest in legal challenges, non-violent local mobilization, political parties, and—on the occasions when these fail—violent resistance (Love 2009).

- Environment and climate. The celebrated Green Belt movement in Kenya has its lower-profile counterparts throughout the region, with communities concerned to protect their natural resources (Van de Geissen 2011).

### II. Geographical and Historical Background

There is no agreed definition of the Horn of Africa. For the EU, the HoA is officially defined as the eight member states of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), namely: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. However, this definition needs to be amended to encompass the de facto reality of the self-declared but unrecognized Republic of Somaliland, and also the fact that Kenya and Uganda, while full members of IGAD, are also members of the East
African Community (EAC) which is, for them, the primary and most salient regional economic community (REC). In this paper, Kenya and Uganda will be considered primarily insofar as they engage with the other members of the IGAD bloc, notably Kenya through its engagement in Somalia and Uganda through its role in South Sudan.

All these are, however, definitions of convenience. The people of these countries do not define themselves as citizens of the ‘Horn’ and rarely see themselves as having a common identity. There is no historical, geographical or political consensus on what the ‘Horn’ should be.

Moreover, the term ‘Horn of Africa’ is an external label. It has been used by the great powers of the day to refer to a region that has geo-strategic concern, because of its position on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the headwaters of the Nile. The use of the term reflects the way in which the identity of the region, and its peace and security priorities, have been set by outsiders.

A Region of Unparalleled Diversity

There are few parts of the world with greater diversity. The peoples of the HoA have some of the world’s oldest and most complex civilizations: Sudan has more and older pyramids than Egypt; Ethiopia has ancient Semitic languages and Hebraic faiths, and some of the longest-established Christian communities in the world; the Prophet Mohammed sent his companions to seek asylum on the southern shores of the Red Sea (which they received); and the city of Harar is one of Islam’s holiest sites. The region today is evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, with significant numbers of ‘noble spiritual believers’ (to use the apt terminology of the 1973 Sudanese constitution, far more accurate and respectful than the commonly-used and misleading term ‘animists’), notably in South Sudan and south-west Ethiopia. Ethiopia possesses several indigenous scripts, and there is more linguistic diversity within the Nuba Mountains of Sudan than in the entire African continent south of the Equator. While the Somali people, spread over four or five countries in the HoA (and now with a global diaspora) possess a common language and culture, there are also significant diverse minorities in Somalia, especially in the riverian areas of the south of the country. And the Rift Valley is of course the site of the oldest identified human ancestors on the planet.

Most of the peoples of the HoA have multiple identities: they have allegiance to nations, to ‘nationalities’ (the Marxist language of historically-constituted identity remains current in Ethiopia, which has a constitution, adopted in 1995, which echoes the Soviet Union in awarding its constituent nationalities the right of self-determination), to ethnicities, to faiths, to livelihoods and to communities. These identities are multiple not only in that people can call on different identity markers depending on context, but also in that individuals and communities are flexible and creative in the ways in which they self-identify. Modernist political projects that try to enforce unitary ethnic or religious identities on people, do violence to the subtle and flexible nature of allegiances.

A Poor Region, with Fast but Uneven Growth
For decades, the HoA has been synonymous with famine. This was infamously the case in Ethiopia prior to 1990, while Sudan continues to suffer humanitarian emergencies associated with war and mass atrocity, notably in Darfur in 2004-05. Food security crises in Ethiopia in 2002 and 2015 have not led to mass starvation, but the country remains vulnerable (Davison 2015). Somalia suffered the most severe famine of the 21st century thus far in 2011, with 168,000-258,000 excess deaths estimated (Checchi and Robinson 2013).

Vulnerability to famine is a function of politics: the HoA’s famines are mass atrocities perpetrated in the context of war, repression and violations of international humanitarian law. All the famines cited have been acts of men rather than nature. The 2011 famine in Somalia is a particularly salient example, in that not only did the extremist group Al-Shabaab impose punitive exploitative measures on the population under its control and create extreme difficulties for humanitarian agencies, but U.S. counter-terror legislation compounded the humanitarian challenge by criminalizing any relief efforts that might have provided even modest material assistance to Al-Shabaab (Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict, n.d.; Jackson and Aynite 2013; Maxwell and Majid 2016).

The HoA has some of the worst human development indicators in the world. According to the 2014 data (UNDP World Development Reports 2015)

Out of 187 countries in the world, Eritrea ranks 182, Ethiopia 173, Djibouti 170 and Sudan 166, while Somalia and South Sudan are unranked due to lack of data.

However, rapid economic growth and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, especially in Ethiopia, have meant that today’s young people in the Horn have far better life chances than their parents or grandparents. Ethiopia’s GDP per capita (PPP) has doubled since 2000 (from $612 to $1218), while Eritrea’s has declined ($1446 to $1180) (UNDP 2015). Sudan’s GDP per capita has increased over the same period—corresponding with its oil boom—from $2,277 to $3,370.

It is also a region of striking inequalities. Within Sudan alone, there is a tremendous disparity between the levels of income and services in metropolitan Khartoum, and the rural peripheries. While the capital city is a middle-income enclave, many parts of rural Sudan are among the least developed places on the planet. Somalia has achieved remarkable economic growth even during the years of state collapse (Leeson 2007), but conflict-affected areas remain famine-prone (Maxwell and Majid 2016).

In one respect, the diversity of the Horn has been turned to advantage. That is efforts at regional economic integration. The countries of the region have radically different resource endowments, in terms of agriculture, water, minerals, and potential for power. Ethiopia has identified poverty reduction as the centre of its national security strategy and to that end has embarked upon a policy of accelerated economic growth, which includes ambitious programmes of infrastructural links to its neighbours, notably transport and power grids. This integration has not, however, led to the dismantling of
barriers to trade or the free movement of people, as the disparities in economic
development would, it is feared, disadvantage the less developed countries, notably
Ethiopia itself. Only Eritrea—isolated both by its own choice and by the efforts of
Ethiopia—has failed to benefit from the rapid growth of the region’s infrastructure and
income. Accelerated growth also brings significant tensions, notably over land (with
conflicts arising from large-scale land acquisition in all countries) and water (notably the
disputes over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile).

The World Bank has launched a Horn of Africa Initiative (World Bank 2015), that involves
national governments and multilateral organizations. Its focus is programmatic: on
transport and communications infrastructure; development in the borderlands; and on
the analytics of the drivers of humanitarian crisis (along with UNOCHA). Its initiative
defines the Horn to include the Great Lakes. The initiative does not engage with the key
issue of political finance: the funds provided to political actors in the regional political
marketplace. Given the significance of political finance, and the success of the business
community in certain places (notably Somaliland) in regulating politics through financial
means, this measure demands research and examination.

The HoA is vulnerable to environmental crisis, exacerbated by climate change. This may
emerge as the greatest threat to human security in the region (Admassu et al. 2014),
though the impacts are expected to be highly variable across different countries and
ecological-climatic zones. Ethiopia has pioneered the global South’s strategies for
approaching responses to climate change (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,
2011; Kaur 2013). There is a pressing need for the HoA to develop a coordinated
response to the threats posed by climate change, especially one that engages the people
of the region in the discussion.

A Region Defined by Geo-Strategic Concerns

The Horn of Africa has historically been defined by its political troubles: it is where the
world’s great powers take an interest regional politics. This is important: all discussions
about ‘the Horn’ are framed by how it causes problems for the rest of the world, and
the corollary of how great power engagement in the region complicates its politics and
prolongs or escalates its conflicts.

The HoA shot to geo-strategic significance after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.
The Red Sea became the vital artery for trade between Europe and Asia, and to this day
it carries about 13 percent of world trade. The biggest prize was Egypt, and the Egyptians
themselves as well as the colonial powers believed that whoever controlled the Nile
headwaters, would have the leverage to control Egypt (Moorhead 1962). This generated
an axis of territorial contestation, along the Nile Valley. As more than 80 percent of the
Nile waters come from the Blue Nile, Sobat and Tekezze rivers that rise in the Ethiopian
highlands, the highest stakes were there, and the Ethiopian rulers were adept and
ruthless in maintaining their own independence and also joining the colonial landgrab,
albeit as a junior party (Erlich 1996).
The southern gateway to the Red Sea (the Bab al Mandab) also became an arena of imperial contestation, with the British occupying Aden and Somaliland, the French occupying Djibouti, and the Italians taking the Eritrean littoral. This has been an even more fractious zone of contestation (Aliboni 1985).

The legacy of this carve-up was manifest decades later in the fractious territorial dispensation during the post-World War Two decolonization, which denied rights of self-determination to Somalis whose lands had been annexed to Ethiopia and Kenya, to Eritreans, and to South Sudanese (Lewis 1983). A further twist to this tale occurred with the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977-78, in which the United States and USSR switched their Cold War clients, thereby in the memorable words of Cyrus Vance, leaving ‘détente buried in the sands of the Ogaden.’ This was only one of two moments in the Cold War (the first being the Congo Crisis) at which an African war threatened super-power confrontation.

The stakes in the Red Sea were further complicated by the Arab-Israeli confrontation, which a Saudi-led coalition intended to turn into an ‘Arab Lake’ at the expense of the Israelis, who in response turned to alliances in Ethiopia.

In the 1980s, Sudan was for the first time referred to as part of the HoA, as it became dragged into the subregional Cold War, on the American side. Sudan is the pivot of the Nile Valley and also has a Red Sea coastline, and the famine of 1984-85 meant that it shared the humanitarian limelight with Ethiopia. Khartoum’s sponsorship of al Qa’ida in the 1990s, prompted a regional coalition of ‘new leaders’ in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda to unite against it, earning the plaudits and backing of the U.S. Following the genocide in Rwanda, the new Rwandese Patriotic Front government in that country became an honorary member of the ‘frontline states’ and ‘new breed’ of African leaders, and in recognition of this, USAID launched a ‘Greater Horn of Africa Initiative’ that included Rwanda, Burundi and DRC as well as the IGAD countries (de Waal 2004). (This nomenclature did not last: Rwanda and Burundi are normally classed as part of the ‘Great Lakes’, though this broader definition is found in the World Bank Horn of Africa Initiative.)

In 2003, the U.S. established Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, as the headquarters of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HoA), the U.S. military’s only permanent presence on the African continent. It was initially under CENTCOM and was transferred to AFRICOM in 2008. From Djibouti, the U.S. flies aircraft and drones on missions in Yemen and Somalia. The U.S. has six other drone bases in the Horn (Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya) and one in the Seychelles. France also maintains a Foreign Legion base in Djibouti, and China has recently signed a lease on a base there. Russia is actively seeking a foothold on the Red Sea coast too.

The crisis over Somali maritime piracy and the transnational challenge of the militant group Al-Shabaab, returned the centre of international concern to its more traditional axis of the Red Sea. Recent tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile Waters,
consequent on the building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, also revived concerns over the regional politics of the Nile Valley. These have, however, been managed with some success by the World Bank’s Nile Basin Initiative, and in March 2015, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan signed a declaration of principles over the waters of the eastern Nile Basin. The outbreak of civil war in Yemen, generated renewed strategic interest in the Red Sea: this accompanied Saudi plans for a Red Sea fleet, the creation of a Saudi-led coalition of the willing to intervene in Yemen, and most recently Egyptian-Saudi pressure which led to Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan all cutting ties with Iran. Meanwhile, international concern with the mass exodus of young Eritreans seeking refuge and a better life in the neighbouring countries, in Israel and in Europe has increased. One particularly shocking dimension to this is human trafficking, ransoming and extortion of refugees, and human organ harvesting.

This history of security issues in the HoA has one element in common: the problems, the agendas, the goals and the terms of the debate are set by outsiders, in conformity with their interests. The EU strategic framework properly aims ‘to support the people of the region in achieving greater peace, security [etc.]’: it is critically important that this is not lip service but that the agenda and goals are set through an inclusive process within the region.

A Turbulent Political Marketplace

The HoA consists of small open economies at the margins of the world economy. Their wellbeing and development is subject to the vagaries of the global markets in oil, coffee, livestock and a handful of other commodities. They are also heavily dependent on flows of funds from aid, remittances, and political and security cooperation payments, which are also subject to the shifting political priorities determined elsewhere. U.S. policies on counter-terrorism can massively impact remittances to Somalia, and Saudi and Emirati political cooperation policies can similarly determine financial flows to Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia (de Waal 2015).

The HoA and its peoples are exposed to peace and security threats emanating from inside and outside the region. In an incomplete listing, the 2013 review of the EU Strategic Framework identified key threats to the peace and security of the region:

There are three main poles of instability in addition to Somalia: a) The Ethiopia-Eritrea tension; b) The relations between Sudan and South Sudan; (c) and the management of the Nile waters. These three poles of instability, combined with weak governance, produce a regional security and political landscape dominated by borders’ dispute, States interferences in each other affairs, porous borders, forced migrations, and alternative centre of powers that weaken the state apparatus (Council of the EU Secretariat, 2013, p. 20).

The review also mentioned the rise of radical Islam and conflicts over resources. These require us to attend to threats emanating from outside the region itself, in particular the dangers of political rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile Waters, the extra-
regional and geo-strategic politics of the Red Sea, and the role of external (particularly Wahhabi) sponsorship of militant Islamism.

Internal factors have also generated new threats in the last two years. One is the civil war in South Sudan, which has repercussions not just for South Sudan but for regional peace and security, and the other is the slowly escalating crisis in Eritrea which will, sooner or later, lead to a political crisis in that country.

A notable historical anomaly is that, unlike in prior decades, Ethiopia is not currently seen as the principle driver of regional insecurity. In the period from World War II to 1991, Ethiopia’s territorial ambitions generated crises in Eritrea and Somalia, while its internal conflicts created refugees and led to reciprocal destabilization, through sponsoring armed insurgents, by the governments of the region. Ethiopia still uses military force to maintain its national security perimeter in depth. Its unresolved border conflict with Eritrea, and the resulting proxy conflict between Addis Ababa and Asmara over the last fifteen years, is a major impediment on the stabilization of the region. Ethiopia has successfully shut off Eritrea from influence in Africa and a voice at the UN. But its policy does not go beyond isolating and silencing Eritrea—there is no regional or international contingency plan for Eritrea. Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia in 2006, to remove the Union of Islamic Courts (and the latter’s Eritrean military advisers), is widely recognized as the key factor in the current insurgency. Nonetheless, the international consensus is that Ethiopia is a force for stability in the region, and that its dominant status vis-à-vis its neighbors to east, west and north, is a fact of political life that should be accepted.

Contested Multilateralism and the Lack of a Security Community

One of the striking features of the Horn of Africa is the lack of a consensual security community. This not only means that the mechanisms for resolving conflicts within the region are weak, but there is an enduring threat to national and regional ownership of the region’s agenda. Powers outside the region (e.g. the P5 at the UN Security Council or the GCC) can take political decisions with major repercussions for the HoA, without the interests of the region in mind. There is a pressing need for a wider multilateralism (a collective security mechanism involving not just the states of the region but those in adjoining regions) and a deeper multilateralism (involving security, economic, governance and democracy agendas).

Emperor Haile Selassie was one of the most eloquent and prescient exponents of collective security and international law, famously in his 1936 speech at the League of Nations, and later for his pivotal role in enabling the formation of a single African inter-state entity, the Organisation of African Unity (no mean feat at the height of the Cold War in 1963). Ethiopia is a historic multilateralist, seeking to embed its foreign policies with multilateral institutions, and serving as host to the AU. Sudan was, with Ethiopia, a founder member of the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. But by the same token, multilateralism and multilateral institutions are treated with skepticism.
by others in the Horn. Eritrea was denied its right of self-determination by the UN and OAU; the territorial principle of *uti possedites* adopted by newly-independent African states in 1964, to respect inherited colonial boundaries, was vigorously disputed by Somalia (leading to two inter-state wars); and southern Sudanese felt they were defrauded of their right of self-determination by their northern brethren through the stratagems used to achieve national independence for Sudan in 1956 (rather than unity with Egypt).

Today, the UN, AU and IGAD are seen by many Eritreans and Somalis as vehicles for the power interests of the U.S., Europe and Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the inter-connected nature of the conflicts and governance problems in the HoA, and the involvement of the region in both the crises and the solutions to them, determines the need for an overall integrated and holistic regional framework.

The HoA demands not only a multilateral approach, but also an approach of multiple and overlapping multilateralisms. In addition to the AU and IGAD, there are numerous overlapping multilateral organizations engaged in the HoA: African, trans-regional, and non-African, some political, some developmental, and some both:

- East African Community (EAC)
- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
- Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
- International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)
- Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)
- League of Arab States (LAS)
- Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
- Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
- Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Despite this plethora of multilateral organizations, there is no single agreed regional peace and security forum. Neither the AU nor IGAD can play the uncontested roles of custodian of norms, forum for conflict management, and arbiter of disputes. The two organizations are divided on too many issues. Eritrea is suspended from IGAD and the Ethiopians do not want it readmitted. Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan are competing for influence in South Sudan. Only in Somalia do the regional states act in concert—and in this instance only because Eritrea’s role in Somalia has been effectively stamped out by international pressures, discreetly but effectively orchestrated from Addis Ababa. Ethiopia has emerged as the closest thing to a hegemon in the region. As host of the AU and heir to a tradition of unusually skillful diplomacy, Ethiopia usually gets its way at the AU and the UN. Ethiopia has chaired IGAD for the last ten years and has the support of Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia in continuing in that position. But Ethiopia’s role is quietly
resented and may yet be challenged by its neighbours. As a potential hegemon in the wider region, Ethiopia also remains junior to Egypt and—of particular and growing significance—the alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Recognizing the shortcomings of IGAD, the AU has played a complementary role in the peace and security in the Horn. It is the custodian of the June 2000 Algiers Agreement that ended the Ethio-Eritrean war and it stepped in to organize the intervention force in Somalia in 2007, with AMISOM taking over from IGASOM. At a regional level, in September 2013 the AU PSC mandated a conference on peace, security, stability, cooperation and development in the Horn of Africa (CPHA) and tasked the AUHIP with preparing for and convening the conference (AU PSC communiqué 397). The CPHA has the potential to be a vehicle for articulating a framework for key regional peace and security challenges.

The multilateral collective security mechanisms for the Horn of Africa have been moderately effective in reducing armed conflict and promoting peace agreements. However they have increasingly become an elitist, governmental mechanism, inaccessible to civil society and the citizenry at large. As governments have taken an authoritarian turn, the possibility of the AU and IGAD secretariats acting as activist organizations promoting human security has also diminished.

The complicated and unclear multilateral peace and security architecture of the HoA provides an opportunity for the EU. The EU will not be a primary security actor in the region, as it is unlikely to project any military power. However, while using military force may be effective in making a country’s presence known, it is much less so at finding durable solutions to political problems. The EU’s soft power, in development assistance, diplomatic finance, and promotion of multilateralism, may be less noisy and less impressive in terms of battleships, but is all the more significant for that. Precisely because EU is not seeking to project force it is a valued partner for AU and IGAD, could take the lead in facilitating political dialogue in sensitive areas, including for example trans-regional multilateralism (e.g. a forum on the Red Sea).

III. A Human Security Framework

This section outlines the key human security issues in the HoA and how the EU might strategically engage with them.

(A) Promoting Human Rights

The human rights agenda in the HoA includes civil and political rights and, with equal standing, social, economic and cultural rights. It also includes respect for humanitarian law.
Civil and political rights are not a priority for any political actor in the region and are not 
at the top of any external agenda. There are multiple formal commitments to human 
rights, but these are often honoured in the breach. According to Freedom House, in 
2015, Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea counted among ‘the worst of the worst’ while Ethiopia 
and South Sudan were ‘not free.’ Eritrea, Ethiopia and South Sudan languish at the 
bottom of the world tables for press freedoms.

Violations of international humanitarian law during armed conflict are rampant and 
largely unchecked. The AU has turned its back on the International Criminal Court, 
leading to significant tension with the EU, although EU diplomats in the Horn privately 
recognize the political errors made by the former ICC prosecutor that contributed to this 
estrangement. In 2009, the AU High Level Panel for Darfur proposed a hybrid court for 
war crimes in Darfur, but the Government of Sudan stalled on the proposal, deftly 
leveraging the Qatar-convened Darfur peace talks to undermine any possibility of a 
robust process of accountability. In South Sudan, neither IGAD nor the AU was 
enthusiastic about the AU Commission of Inquiry into South Sudan, which reported in 
January 2015, but its report was not released until October 2015. The proposal for a 
hybrid court, contained in the August 2015 Compromise Peace Agreement for South 
Sudan, is unlikely to be among the priorities for implementation.

The critical review of the EU-Horn strategy (Soliman et al. 2013) observed that the EU 
put human rights and democracy concerns in Ethiopia second to concerns over 
political stability, strategic engagement, and continued engagement with effective 
poverty reduction. The authors noted (p. 35):

> Practically speaking the human rights and democratization agenda will continue 
to gain very little traction in the Horn of Africa. Emerging out of post-conflict 
scenarios, Somalia and South Sudan offer the most fertile ground for the EU’s 
new policies and initiatives. However, human rights violations will continue in 
the region, as will lip-service towards democracy - and there is no doubt so will 
the EU’s preference for engagement and influence over conditionality and 
sanctions.

The most effective long-term pressures for human rights come from an informed and 
active citizenry. As well as continuing its routine representation to the governments of 
the region on human rights issues, the EU can explore ways of promoting regional civil 
society forums that can expand capacities for human rights mobilization. Both IGAD and 
the AU have civil society and human rights mechanisms that are, in principle, open to 
civil society. Independent civil society networks for the promotion of peace and security 
are also forming (eg. Naivasha Declaration on Regional Civil Society Engagement in 
There is also a pressing need for further expansion towards trans-regional human rights 
dialogue, between the HoA and the Arab world, including especially Egypt, Yemen and 
the Gulf countries.
Pursuing a human rights agenda in this region, requires explicitly connecting social, economic and cultural rights equally alongside civil and political rights. The former are recognized and articulated by governments, local authorities, including traditional leaders, and civil society, defined broadly. Ethiopia, which has the best-articulated position on these issues, insists that the conquest of extreme poverty is a human rights priority, and that economic development including the provision of essential services, should be sequenced before general political liberalization. Civil society and community groups, and unarmed and armed political opposition in all countries has drawn upon social and economic issues, including land rights, and cultural issues such as language rights. These issues are important points of entry for dialogue on human rights at all levels.

(B) Addressing Humanitarian Needs, Advancing Economic Development and Poverty Reduction

Humanitarian crises are likely to recur in the HoA, especially associated with conflict and mass distress migration, compounded by the impact of the current El Niño and climate change. Figures 1 and 2 are drawn from UNOCHA that illustrate this.

If the HoA suffers an increase in violent extremism, then the dilemma acutely manifest during the Somali famine of 2011—how to deliver humanitarian relief to communities controlled by groups designated as terrorists—will recur. The EU should consider a strategic position on humanitarian principles in conflicts involving extremist/terrorist groups to ensure that life-threatening restrictions on humanitarian assistance do not occur again.

Human security involves economic development in the broad sense of enhancing all aspects of well-being. The countries of the Horn display several distinct patterns of growth and poverty reduction; diverse approaches to development and poverty reduction. In Sudan there is a cycle of boom and bust based on rents (borrowing and oil), and wide inequalities. South Sudan is an exaggerated version of Sudan: great wealth for a few and deep poverty for the many, and profound corruption to the extent that the country can be called a ‘kleptocracy.’ In Somalia, there is considerable wealth among the diaspora, business class and pastoralists, which has never been captured by the state, nor even properly measured. Somalia always confounds conventional analyses by prospering amid governmental crisis. Ethiopia is vast and impoverished and in the middle of an extraordinary experiment in accelerated economic growth, based on infrastructure, agriculture and industry; thus far broadly based. Formerly a byword for extreme poverty and hunger, Ethiopia is—if its current growth rates are sustained for a decade—on track to achieve middle-income status. It is the only country in the region that has a cogent strategy for broad-based development. Eritrea, once the most industrialized country in sub-Saharan Africa apart from South Africa, has been gradually impoverished since the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia. It is pursing garrison rentier
economics, with collapse staved off by a recent boom in the mining sector. Djibouti is a prosperous enclave economy.

Ethiopia’s national security and foreign policy white paper (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2002) identified poverty reduction as both the objective and the main mechanism for achieving national security. The paper states that, ‘The real source of our national humiliation in our time is poverty and backwardness’ (p. 12). It argues that national pride is not a policy objective in itself: it must come about through realizing democracy and development. While countries remain poor, integrated into the margins of the global political economy and vulnerable to internal and external shocks, they will always be insecure. Growth is therefore a matter not only of reducing poverty but of national security, even national survival. ‘The failure to realize development and democracy has resulted in our security being threatened. It means we have remained impoverished, dependent and unable to hold our heads high. The prospect of disintegration cannot be totally ruled out’ (p. 23).

Among other things, Ethiopia’s ‘economy-centered strategy’ focuses on developing infrastructural links with neighbouring countries (the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is an example of how Sudanese irrigated agriculture has become tied in to Ethiopia’s development).

The EU and its Member States are the largest contributor to development cooperation and assistance in the Horn. Under the 10th European Development Fund disbursement, the EU provides €2 billion in bilateral support to IGAD member states and a further €645 million to regional organizations and projects. A further €760 million is provided in humanitarian response funding. With funds committed to prevent distress migration from the HoA to Europe, the EU financial commitment to the region will grow further.

Development assistance presents both opportunities for engagement and leverage and risks of entanglement with authoritarianism and corruption. This will require policy shifts in particular related to Eritrea and South Sudan. Eritrea has been isolated from international support in comparison to neighbouring Ethiopia. The prospect of an influx of new funds may serve to strengthen the regime and its security apparatus. In developing policies and programmes, the EU would benefit from engagements with an established Eritrean diaspora and more recent waves of refugees that are scattered across Europe. Eritreans outside the country are divided in their loyalty or opposition to the regime; inclusive consultations on the development challenge in Eritrea nevertheless have the potential to yield a deeper understanding of the present and future development challenges inside the country (Bereketeab 2009).

For South Sudan, there is a need to learn from the failure of the ‘statebuilding’ agenda. Both during the ongoing conflict and in its aftermath, it is vital to avoid concentration of expenditure at the centre, where it is readily absorbed by the political budgets of the elite or simply creamed off for personal enrichment (World Bank 2013; de Waal 2014). Support to the security sector has proved a particularly egregious formula for failure,
corruption, and the co-option of donor funds for factional gain or simple larceny (Rands 2010; Snowden 2012). The aim should be to pursue support at sub-national and local levels. This need not mean exclusively working with NGOs and civil society groups, rather it is important to also seek out and support local authorities committed to community development, for instance at county level. The EU should look to promote inclusive forms of local citizenship, that can both resonate with existing commitments to the welfare of the ‘community’ and identify mechanisms expand these beyond their generally ethnically defined boundaries. Key priorities should include support for education, agriculture-based livelihoods, and improvements to the justice system at local levels. The EU is already engaged with these issues and must continue to explore how to consistently reconfigure its approach to identify and build upon citizenship and ‘state formation’ from below.

(C) Seeking Peace and Security

Preventing, managing and resolving conflict at various levels, and protecting individuals from organized violence, lie at the centre of human security. Armed conflict and repression has generated poverty, hunger and mass displacement across the Horn over decades. It continues to do so, though the locations of these deprivations have changed over time.

It is striking—in contrast to historical patterns—that the identified zones of conflict and instability do not include Ethiopia. This is partly a definitional issue (the UN and IGAD do not define certain areas as ‘conflict and instability’ for political and operational reasons), but also reflects the remarkable political stabilization and economic transformation of Ethiopia over the last twenty years.

Extra-regional conflicts

The Horn is influenced by extra-regional armed conflicts, notably in Yemen, Libya, DRC, and CAR. These are significant in several ways. First, they have spill-over effects such as refugees. Second, IGAD member states are actively involved in some of them (e.g. Sudan is a member of the Saudi-Egypt-UAE coalition in Yemen; Sudan and South Sudan have forces directly or indirectly involved in CAR). This generates vested interests and secondary disputes. For example, Sudan’s alignment with Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the associated financial benefits received mean that it feels able to spurn the AU on internal conflict resolution matters. The Yemen-Eritrea dispute over the Hanish Islands, which led to a brief war in 1995, has been formally settled but remains a source of friction still. Eritrea did not restore diplomatic relations with Sanaa until early 2015, and provided training to Houthi rebels until recently. It provide military facilities to the UAE at Assab, and briefly allowed its airbase there to be used by the UAE for military flights, until Ethiopia objected on the grounds that Assab remained a war zone and it could not guarantee the safety of UAE aircraft.

Inter-state and transnational conflicts
The Horn has a long catalogue of inter-state boundary disputes, active and latent, and other international conflicts, including countries sponsoring proxies against one another, fighting bilateral disputes in the territory of a third country (e.g. the Ethiopian attacks on Eritreans in Somalia in 2006), and non-state groups that range over different territories (e.g. the Lord’s Resistance Army, which has been active in Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and CAR, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) which has been active in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Libya and South Sudan, involving itself in internal conflicts in Chad and CAR at minimum). Most of these inter-state military actions remained undocumented and/or do not appear in the standard databases of conflicts, and so escape conventional political science analysis (de Waal 2004). (A list of cross-border violent incidents involving governments of the countries of the Horn between 1960 and 2015 runs to a minimum of 92 cases (Twagiramungu forthcoming.)

The following are the major current cases of boundary disputes:

- **Ethiopia-Eritrea**: the most hotly disputed and politically salient unresolved inter-state war;
- **Eritrea-Djibouti**: a boundary dispute that has led to war;
- **Sudan-South Sudan** (including armed conflict over Abyei, five other disputed areas, and several areas claimed by South Sudan including Heglig);
- **South Sudan-Kenya** (a border dispute over the Ilemi Triangle, not currently active);
- **South Sudan-Uganda** (South Sudan has made claims along the border, which have led to local conflicts);
- **Sudan-Egypt** (conflict over the Halaib Triangle, which has intermittently led to armed clashes; this dispute has the celebrated anomaly of the ‘unclaimed’ territory of Biir Tawiil).
- **Somalia-Somaliland**: the Somaliland Republic claims that its boundaries are those of the former colonial territory, while the Somali region of Puntland claims the areas inhabited by Daarood clans.

There are also political disputes/conflicts on many of these borders. Additionally, Sudan and South Sudan are supporting one another’s rebels (for reasons only partly associated with their boundary disputes); there is a proxy dispute between Sudan and Uganda; and there is political competition between Ethiopia and Kenya (notably over the Jubba Valley region of Somalia) and Ethiopia and Uganda (notably in South Sudan).

The AU, using the AU Border Programme, is seeking systematically to delineate and demarcate borders and to minimize the potential for inter-state conflict.

The implication of the ubiquity of inter-state conflicts and contests, and the involvement of neighbouring states in each and every internal conflict, means that any peace negotiations to resolve an internal conflict requires (at minimum) a pre-negotiation
among the regional powers and stakeholders to resolve, or accommodate, their political differences.

**Internal Conflicts**

The most important internal conflicts are:

- **Somalia**: ongoing civil war/counterinsurgency of Federal Government of Somalia against al-Shabaab, bearing in mind that should this conflict be resolved there are numerous other latent disputes within Somalia that could become active;

- **South Sudan**: the civil war was ostensibly settled by the August 2015 ‘Compromise Peace Agreement’ but most indications are that armed conflict will continue;

- **Sudan**: ongoing armed conflict with the SPLM-North in the ‘two areas’ of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, and with various Darfurian groups including the SLA (Minawi), SLA (Abdel-Wahid) and JEM.

**Local Conflicts**

There are numerous local conflicts, most of which have not been systematically mapped.

- **South Sudan**: IGAD identified a baseline of 94 local conflicts in South Sudan (IGAD 2013).

- **Ethiopia**: IGAD baseline study (unpublished) identified a baseline of 68 local conflicts, many of them involving land ownership and boundaries.

- **Sudan**: Darfur is a patchwork of multiple local conflicts, including many of them among Arab groups. There are also intermittently violent conflicts in Kordofan and eastern Sudan.

- **Somalia and Somaliland**: numerous local conflicts are obscured by the major confrontation between the Federal Government and Al-Shabaab, which are likely to surface.

The IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) focuses on three ‘conflict clusters’—the Karamoja, Somali and Dhikil (Djibouti) cross-border pastoral zones—in which conflicts are at risk of spreading across the territories of two or more IGAD member states.

**EU Engagement**

The EU supports, financially and politically, a number of conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms at the AU and IGAD. Among these are:

1. The AU’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN);

2. AU Border Programme;
3. African Peace Facility, particularly significant for its role in supporting AMISOM, and previously AMIS in Darfur;
   a. AMISOM funding (€411m for 2013)
   b. AMIS (€305 m total 2006-07)

4. Co-chairing the HoA group of Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, along with Turkey, with special attention to measures to track and intercept terrorist finance;

5. Maritime security;
   a. EUNAVFOR Atalanta counter piracy;
   b. Critical Maritime Routes Programme (MARSIC) based in Yemen;
   c. EUCAP NESTOR for training national maritime security and law enforcement forces (coast guard, navy, civilian coastal and maritime police, prosecutors, judges), based in Djibouti;

6. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) tracking and monitoring;

7. Financial and diplomatic support to peace negotiations, notably:
   a. IGAD mediation in Somalia leading to the creation of the SFG;
   b. AUHIP facilitation of the Sudan-South Sudan separation and the resolution of the 2012 conflict between the two countries and related issues;
   c. IGAD mediation in South Sudan leading to the Compromise Peace Agreement of 2015.

The efficacy of these interventions is uneven. In each case, there are valid criticisms of the approaches taken by the AU or IGAD mediators. However, the key consideration for the EU strategy is not to see how each intervention could tactically be improved, but instead to provide mechanisms for enabling the AU and IGAD to do the learning.

Civil society inclusion

African civil society was instrumental in promoting key norms adopted by African governments and the African Union, such as the principle of non-indifference (developed in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda) and the ban on accepting military coups. Civil society engagement was important in framing the very idea of an ‘African Peace and Security Architecture.’ (InterAfrica Group and Justice Africa 2002) and in the IGAD peace and security strategy (IGAD 2007). The consensus document on the IGAD peace and security strategy, adopted in Khartoum in 2005, specified the following elements in ‘the way forward’ (IGAD 2007, p. 211):

The conference was the first stage in a step-by-step process to mobilize stakeholders and engage member states and experts to produce the desired output of a draft strategy
Further activities include:

- Focused research on CPMR [conflict prevention, management and resolution] in all IGAD Member States and other RECs;
- A series of output-oriented workshops including representatives of all levels and perspectives (e.g. gender) of society relevant to CPMR of violent conflict in the IGAD region;
- Assistance from consultants;
- Evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of peace processes in the region;
- Collaboration with non-profit, profit and governmental institutions; and
- Involvement of the media and educational bodies in the region.

This recommendation was not implemented. In fact, subsequently, civil society engagement has withered. This is partly because many of the leaders of the early 2000s pressure have either joined the AU and UN, or have died. The death of the Secretary-General of the Pan African Movement, Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, in 2009, was a particular loss. The African Union Peace and Security Department itself has served as a focus for bureaucratic activism, promoting bold solutions to peace and security challenges through its position as the drafter of the communiqués of the AU Peace and Security Council. However, all these pressures require constant vigilance, because there is strong and persistent push-back from governments.

(D) Promoting Legitimate Political Authority and Good Governance, Including Empowerment

Any effort to define ‘legitimate political authority’ with respect to states will run into difficulties in the HoA. The three main states that existed thirty years ago have become de jure five and de facto six, and many boundaries are contested. Rebel movements have exercised governmentality that rivals that of recognized governments (during the 1983-2005 war the SPLM was known to local people in southern Sudan as *hukuma*—government—in the sense of our government) (Leonardi 2007). Possibly the most democratic polity in the region—Somaliland—does not enjoy any external recognition. In the best-administered country—Ethiopia—there is a dynamic process of devolution of authority to local level. Moreover, effective governmental capacity involves extraterritorial elements, including engagement with politically and financially significant diaspora populations.

The key concept for mechanisms to promote legitimate political authority, good governance and empowerment is *public authority*. It is critically important to recognize the diverse forms that public authority can take, sometimes assuming qualities of stateness, and sometimes functioning on the basis of public mutuality quite distinct

---

2 This concept is used to describe the variety of institutions that exercise power in contexts of ‘state fragility’ by taking on ‘the mantle of public administrative authority’, usually making reference to the notion of the state and eliciting a degree of voluntary compliance. (Hoffman and Kirk, 2013, p. 11).
from (or indeed in opposition to) standard states. Given that the recognized office
holders in most states operate as political business managers or entrepreneurs in a
political marketplace, a strategy of promoting legitimate authority, good governance
and empowerment through state structures, is likely quickly to be coopted for other
ends, unintended by the donor. Rather, mechanisms to assist and support civic values,
citizens’ cooperation, dialogue and respect for diversity, at different levels, adapted to
the circumstances of different countries, will be more effective.

(E) Adherence to Multilateral Principles with a Regional Focus

The African Union has developed a unique form of multilateralism: both formal and
informal; pervasive and multi-dimensional; focused on peace and security but also
encompassing many governance issues. The AU’s meetings serve as a forum for real
interests to be pursued, as well as adopting declarations and promoting norms. This
leads to charges of hypocrisy and self-serving decisions (for example over the AU’s
position vis-à-vis the ICC and its inconsistent position on term limits for sitting heads of
state)—but those charges and their relevance also show that the AU as a forum is taken
seriously by its member states.

Like any such multilateral forum, the AU is not united on many key issues. The same is
true for the continent’s regional economic communities (RECs) of which IGAD is one.
The strengths and weaknesses of the AU are reflected in IGAD, in sharpened form. It is
a key regional forum, able to act decisively when key member states (notably Ethiopia)
are determined. But it is also no stronger than the collective will of its members, and its
shortcomings, for example on the Ethiopia-Eritrea issue and on South Sudan, reflect this.
The IGAD secretariat is not strong. The UN recently initiated a partnership with IGAD in
late 2015.

The AU PSC has yet to resolve a fundamental question of identity and strategy. In some
respects the AU PSC conducts its activities as if its future consists of it being a distinctly
African decision-making body, seeking ‘African solutions to African problems’, and
building on the comparative advantage of an African institution in defining political
solutions and methods. Thus, for example, on many issues relating to Sudan and to
Sudan-South Sudan relations, the AU PSC has taken a lead in defining the problem and
formulating an international response to it. During the Sudan-South Sudan border war
of April 2012, the AU PSC responded expeditiously with a communiqué (no. 319 of 24
April 2012) which contained a roadmap, which was then adopted almost verbatim as
UNSC resolution 2046, one week later. The AU’s leadership enabled sharp differences
among UNSC members to be overcome, and a coordinated international approach to
the conflict to be promoted.

In other respects, the AU PSC conducts itself principally as if it were a subsidiary
institution to the UN Security Council, implementing UNSC resolutions using resources
generated internationally, in particular UN assessed contributions for AU peace support
operations. Thus, AU PSC communiqué 547 of September 2015, on the future of African
peace support operations, is concerned almost exclusively with how the PSC should act as an implementing authority for UNSC decisions, on the basis of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The principal reason for this is the anticipation that the UNSC may agree to designate assessed contributions from UN member states to fund AU peace operations. A focus on the implementation of peace support operations detracts from the AU’s comparative advantage in the politics of conflict resolution and distracts attention from resolving conflicts and distorts incentives.

These dilemmas are particularly acute in the IGAD region. While the AU and IGAD have taken a political lead in most of the conflicts of the region (Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan), African troop contributing countries have also emphasized their compliance with UNSC decisions, and the corollary demands on UN finance for peacekeeping operations.

The constraints on IGAD member states forming a cohesive regional bloc are very significant. As noted by the 2013 review of the EU-Horn strategic partnership, there is a: ‘lack of a regional security system able to make states feel secure with each other.’ (p. 20) The EU’s October 2006 regional policy partnership document states:

‘For their part, the countries of the Horn must:

a. Obtain a coordinated position among Member States, the IGAD Secretariat, regional players and civil society organisations;

b. Be open to dialogue on key regional challenges and be engaged in identifying the drivers of change;

c. Allocate adequate resources for the dialogue and the work programme;

d. Address sources of conflict and promote cross-sectoral cooperation;

e. Implement relevant institutional reforms.’

These preconditions are unlikely to be achieved. The central problem is (a): a coordinated position will not develop while Ethiopia retains its position as the dominant but not uncontested power. This means that Ethiopia will not allow the development of decision-making or implementation capacities within IGAD that might threaten its status. Ethiopia’s unreadiness to relax control over IGAD’s decisions will change only when it feels no possibility of threat from Eritrea. Hence, strategic policymaking in the region remains controlled by member states, rather than multilateral organizations.

The AU does not want to usurp IGAD nor challenge its Ethiopian host, but the AU Commission leadership is aware of the need to promote multilateral conflict resolution in the Horn. The AU discreetly finds ways of working to address conflicts and issues that IGAD cannot directly engage with. Thus the AU is the custodian of the Ethio-Eritrean agreement of 2000 (the Algiers agreement) and could, at the appropriate moment, reactivate its leadership on the stalled implementation of that agreement. It is
important for the EU to understand these relationships, but to also find ways to engage with both of these key regional actors.

(F) Peace Missions

About one third of the world’s peacekeepers are deployed in the HoA, in five missions. The Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) currently has 22,000 uniformed personnel. The UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has 17,000 but is drawing down. The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) consists of an Ethiopian brigade with a strength of 4,000. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is 12,500. The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) is a coordination mechanism for the armed forces of the countries involved (CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Uganda) which has a target strength of 5,000.

The EU has not undertaken its own peace operations in the HoA (though EUFOR Chad in 2007-09 was deployed on the borders of Sudan, the EU provided military observers to AMIS in 2004-07 and has a Training Mission in Somalia). The EU is, however, by far the largest contributor to the African Peace Facility (and thus the major donor to AMISOM), and EU member states fund a substantial proportion of UN peacekeeping missions in the region through their assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget.

These missions have diverse mandates. AMISOM and the RCI-LRA are mandated by the AU PSC, with AMISOM’s mandate endorsed by the UNSC (resolution 1772 of 2007) and the RCI-LRA supported by a UNSC presidential statement (14 November 2011). Neither of these two missions is a peacekeeping mission: they are combat or counter-insurgency missions. Neither has a mandate that involves the protection of civilians (PoC) although their military objectives—defeating Al-Shabaab and extending the authority of the Somali government, and eliminating the LRA—may be said to entail an outcome that protects civilians. Each of the different troop contributing countries to AMISOM follows its own operational procedures, resulting in diverse outcomes in terms of respect for human rights and protection of civilians. The Kenyan Defence Force contingent in Somalia has been accused of violations of international humanitarian law (including attacks on civilian targets), and complicity with Al-Shabaab in profitable smuggling activities.

AMISOM consumes the lion’s share of the EU financial contribution to the African Peace Facility and is by far the largest single expenditure item for the EU in the HoA. It is an indication of the high political priority placed on the stabilization of Somalia, that the EU has been ready to fund AMISOM, despite the fact that it does not have a significant civilian component, its military and political activities are entirely determined by neighbouring states that have long-standing political, security and economic interests in Somalia, that it has no PoC mandate nor strategy, that at least one of its contingents has been engaged in corrupt commercial activities that support its ostensible enemy al-
Shabaab (Journalists for Justice 2015), and there is no clear prospect of the mission being ‘rehatted’ as a UN mission or achieving its political and security goals.

The UN missions in the HoA (UNAMID, UNISFA and UNMISS) all have PoC mandates. In the case of UNAMID, PoC was the primary political rationale for the deployment of the mission in the first place, driven by international outrage over the mass atrocities in Darfur. With Sudanese governmental consent at best grudging, and UNAMID’s operational strategy focused on physical presence rather than problem-solving, the mission has proved singularly ineffective. The sad experience of UNAMID has been one of the examples that has informed the recommendation by the UN High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to shift from a ‘military first’ to a ‘politics first’ approach to peace operations (HIPPO 2015). It is salutary that the key security advisers involved in the 2005-06 peace negotiations all agreed that a much smaller operation, involving a greater number of civil affairs officers, focused on a strategy of enabling communities to protect themselves. This ‘empowerment’ strategy was overruled by the US and UN leadership in favour of imposing an external protection force.

Currently, armed conflict continues in Darfur, in a complex and shifting manner. The rebel movements founded in the early 2000s still exist but much of the fighting is among Arab groups armed by the government, or consists of opportunistic alliances of commanders who come together for individual operations with local rationales, often looting. Attempts to mediate a negotiated end to this conflict, by the UN, AU and State of Qatar, have not succeeded. Meanwhile, at the demand of the Sudanese government, UNAMID is preparing an exit strategy. It is clear that the Sudanese government will be very reluctant to agree to any new international peace operation in Darfur, although it will be a central demand of the armed opposition in any future peace talks.

Similar considerations apply to the ongoing conflict in the ‘two areas’ of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The parties to the conflict—the Government of Sudan and SPLM-North—have failed to agree even to a humanitarian ceasefire or humanitarian access modalities, let alone a political settlement. At the very outset of the conflict (July 2011), Khartoum insisted that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) battalions in these areas withdraw, in accordance with the end of the UNMIS mandate at that time. Having failed to predict, prevent or mitigate this conflict, and having refused protection to civilians seeking sanctuary in its camps, UNMIS ignominiously withdrew as demanded, escaping public shaming because of the contemporaneous celebration of the independence of South Sudan and the transition of UNMIS to UNMISS in the new country.

UNISFA’s mandate is unique in that it was directly negotiated between the parties (Government of Sudan and SPLM) as part of the Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area (of 20 June 2011) and then adopted by the UNSC (Resolution 1990 of 27 June 2011). The involvement of the parties in the design of the force has contributed to a high level of cooperation and a more effective mission. The Temporary Arrangements Agreement provides for the
demilitarization of Abyei, including the withdrawal of both parties’ forces, with UNISFA taking over security and PoC. A political settlement to the Abyei dispute is not in prospect, so that the ‘interim’ in UNISFA’s title risks becoming indefinite.

Additionally, UNISFA is tasked with providing force protection and logistical support to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mission between South Sudan and Sudan, which takes the form of a conventional Chapter VI military observer mission along the two countries’ common border.

The mandate of UNMISS was originally focused on state-building for the newly-independent Republic of South Sudan (Resolution 1996 of 8 July 2011). Following the catastrophic failure of UNMISS to predict or prevent the outbreak of the South Sudanese civil war in December 2013, and its enforced rescue mission for over 100,000 civilians who sought refuge from massacre in its bases, the UNMISS mandate was revised to focus on PoC (Resolution 2155, 27 May 2014). Currently, UNMISS finds itself in the unprecedented situation of acting as the de facto administrative and judicial authority, as well as protection force, for this population of civilians. UN peace operations practice has been obliged to catch up with this reality, through a number of ad hoc innovations. There is no prospect of an exit for UNMISS in the short or medium term, and indeed its PoC mandate may oblige it to remain for an extremely long period of time.

The diversity of the mandates, operational modalities and outcomes—including on key human security dimensions such as PoC—of the peace operations in the HoA demands a systematic review and assessment. To date, there has been no review of African peace missions, either individually or collectively. This is a particularly pressing issue in view of the readiness of the AU and African member states to take on military missions that are ‘peace’ operations in name only, and that involve few or no PoC activities. The AU Commission has recently commissioned such a review from the World Peace Foundation. The EU should engage with these review processes as well as undertaking an overall assessment from its own human security perspective.

(G) Owning the Agenda

A common thread runs through all the points outlined above: positive outcomes for the people of the HoA are closely associated with the extent to which they are able to own the agenda. Inclusion is fundamental to a human security approach. This begins with setting the agenda and identifying the goals, through participation in implementing programmes, and participation in all mechanisms of public authority, from local to state to regional or international. Ensuring greater and more effective local ownership is exceptionally challenging, given the divisions within the HoA and the widespread popular distrust of authorities, but it is nonetheless essential.
IV. Conclusion: Challenges for the EU and the Horn of Africa

The EU engagement with the HoA on human security principles should be both top-down and bottom-up, focusing at once on states and multilateral organizations, and on civil society and people’s issues.

The HoA is not suited to a single multilateral security and human security framework and mechanism, but rather to a ‘thick multilateralism’ of multiple, overlapping mechanisms that between them provide fora for dealing with the hot issues and the emergent issues. A human security approach should build on what is already there: regional economic integration, Ethiopia’s ‘democratic developmental state’ and commitment to governance of diversity, and regionalized civil society networks.

**Strategic Objective: A Shared Multilateralism, Within the Horn and Among Regional Organizations**

One proposed strategic objective for the EU’s engagement with the Horn is championing regional and inter-regional multilateralism in pursuit of peace, stability and human security. This leverages the EU’s principled and strategic commitment to multilateralism; it distinguishes it from other western approaches that have been to project power and vanquish enemies rather than build peace. It also distinguishes itself from the dominant security strategy in the Middle East that is coalitions of the willing, deterrence and force projection. This can build on the real opportunities that exist in the region, namely a commitment to an African multilateralism. This would, initially, be a multilateralism of political dialogue, in which the states of the wider region manage their interests and differences, minimizing the risk of conflict.

Without an approach that manages the political interests of key states within the Horn and beyond it, the management and resolution of conflicts such as Somalia and South Sudan is impossible. Potential conflicts such as Eritrea could become unmanageable. The lack of a common forum allows key actors such as the Government of Sudan to avoid addressing its internal conflicts, by playing off external powers against one another. It also allows extra-regional conflicts such as Yemen and Libya to become points of dissension within IGAD.

The October 2015 conclusions on the regional action plan noted (p. 14):

> The EU should promote that the Horn of Africa is discussed at Ministerial and Senior Officials' meetings with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and consider the possibility of establishing trilateral meetings, as well as opening structured political dialogues with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in addition to its existing dialogue with the GCC.

The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security visited Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE in November 2015, with a view to establishing memoranda of understanding with those countries on common security issues (ranging from Mali and Libya to Darfur and...
Somalia), and also seeing if they could become major financial contributors to the African Peace Facility. If the Gulf states and the AU Commission establish a donor-recipient relationship it may complicate attempts to pursue a joint approach to conflicts in the Horn.

The EU should regard AU and IGAD as joint partners. A tactical entry point can be the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) which has been tasked with convening a conference on peace, security, stability, cooperation and development in the Horn of Africa (CPHA).

Extra-regional multilateralism is a critical need and a pressing gap at the present. The AU and IGAD need to build links across the boundaries of the RECs and into the Arab peninsular, but have not taken the steps necessary to begin this. The League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council are the two most immediate extra-regional partners. The EU is well-placed to step into this gap. European interests in the Suez Canal and Red Sea are self-evident. The principle of ‘treating Africa as one continent,’ enshrined in the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy should not hamper such extra-regional linkages and collaborations.

Other key issues to promote in a shared multilateral approach (which could involve humanitarian actors, the World Bank, the AfDB and others) include: humanitarian principles in conflicts involving groups designated as terrorists; managing mass distress migration; and regional plans for responding to climate change and associated natural resource management issues.

Finally, a deeper multilateralism should involve engagement with regional civil society, and providing a forum in which civil society organizations can regain their voice in peace and security issues across the region.

A Human Security Engagement on People’s Issues

While the immediate entry point for a shared multilateralism is the strategic hard security threats facing the Horn, the strategy needs to address broader and deeper human security dimensions, if it is to be meaningful and successful. The EU is already engaged across the board in almost every human security issue. The immediate political question is, what issues are already on the agenda, championed by IGAD member states? What frameworks already exist in the Horn that could be the basis for a common strategy?

The principal issues of consensus are the need for economic development and regional infrastructural integration. These are not controversial and are a potential driver of cooperation. A second emergent consensus is on the governance of diversity with decentralization of power as central norm of good democratic governance.

The links between economic development and the governance of diversity and peace and security have been articulated by the AU and IGAD. This provides a foundation for EU engagement, respecting regional and national ownership. The EU is well-placed to
encourage the broadening of the economy-first security strategy to include a broader human security approach, i.e. to make the developmentalism more properly democratic. This requires challenging and reversing the current regional trend towards authoritarianism and the closing of civil society space.

Another element is partnerships between official aid donors and the business sector, in developing mechanisms for transparent political financing, so as to minimize the distortions and perils of rentier political markets.

The principle of empowerment, as articulated by the Commission for Human Security and contained in the EU’s multiple commitments to human rights and democratic freedoms, and to working with civil society, must be a fundamental guide to EU engagement. The EU can engage with existing civil society networks and movements—defined broadly to include the media, political parties committed to non-violent mobilization, as well as the organized NGO sector—to promote these values and practices. Especially where institutions are weak and the formal apparatus of government is routinely coopted into stratagems for gain in the political marketplace, the organized demand for democratic rights and representation is essential to all forms of human security.
References


World Bank, Regional Integration Department, Africa Division, ‘The Horn of Africa Initiative: Newsletter,’ Issue 1, June 2015.
Figures

Figure 1: Current and predicted instability

Source: UNOCHA 2015, p. 9.
Figure 2: Conflict Hotspots and Forced Migration

Source: UNOCHA 2015, p. 10.